I thank the Chair and members for the invitation. It is a good opportunity for us to showcase some of the work we do in areas that are of interest to them. Sometimes people think the European Court of Auditors looks at just the accounts of the EU, which we do to some extent, but we also do a lot of work in various policy areas. I might introduce the court, given not everyone is aware of it. We will then get to matters at hand, namely, issues relating to climate and transport.
We are based in Luxembourg, as some members will know. The Chair and Senator Horkan have visited us there, with the Senator having visited the court as part of a delegation a few years ago. Ours is one of the seven EU institutions, which is important. While we were founded in 1975, we became an institution after the Maastricht treaty, which put us on the same footing as the other institutions. We are there to strengthen EU accountability and transparency. To put it in simple terms, we are basically the equivalent of the Comptroller and Auditor General for the EU budget. We deal with the budgetary control committee in the European Parliament, which is the equivalent of the Committee of Public Accounts here. We also liaise with the various national audit offices, such as the Comptroller and Auditor General here, in all the member states. We are not really fraud investigators - two other bodies in the EU look after that, namely, OLAF and EPPO. Nonetheless, we have reported cases where we have come across fraud in our work. In 2023, for instance, we reported 19 cases to OLAF and 17 to EPPO. Members will see that our circulated statement outlines what we do. We provide an assurance that money is being spent in line with the rules and assess the impact on different policy areas. We try to ensure there is transparency in the use of the EU budget vis-à-vis the European taxpayer.
As for the structure of our organisation, we have between 900 and 1,000 members of staff. There are 27 members, much like how the Commission comprises one Commissioner from each member state, and we are split into five chambers covering the policy areas. Chamber I relates to the natural environment and natural resources, that is, the environment and climate area; chamber II, to cohesion; chamber III, to external relations such as migration, cybersecurity and Ukraine; chamber IV, to research and development, competition, economic surveillance and so on; while chamber V is a horizontal category looking at the EU budget as a whole.
We do a lot of work across all these different policy areas and we are following the EU funding but all these policies are subsequently implemented at member state level so there are implications for the different member states.
Currently there are 25 Irish staff in the European Court of Auditors and three Irish trainees are starting. We proactively try to get in trainees - it is a five-month stint - and have been quite successful in that regard in the past couple of years. As we must produce everything in all the official languages, of which there are now 24, including Gaeilge, we have translators who ensure all our reports and correspondence with the member states are available in the official languages.
We have two main pillars of work. One is the more traditional of financial and compliance audits. That takes up 50% of our time and results in our annual report, which will be published this year on 10 October, which is quite soon. In addition, the five chambers, which I outlined, produce around 30 to 32 special reports. These are reports that focus on particular topics which we think are of interest to policymakers, decision-makers and perhaps the public at large in some cases.
In our work programme for 2024, climate change and the environment accounts for 30% of our work. It really is an area on which we concentrate and produce outputs which are of use to different legislators and policymakers. That is followed by fiscal policies and public finances. All the chambers produce various tasks, with 36 new tasks commencing in 2024. For instance, under climate change, we are conducting 11 audits. We will be looking at combating hunger, sea water quality and managing forest wildfires among others.
Getting more to the bones of the matter, I will turn to climate action funding in the EU. There was a commitment by the Commission to spend 20% of the EU budget for the 2014-20 programming period. That amounts to €216 billion on climate-related actions. We did an audit that said this figure was overstated by €72 billion. We are saying that while the Commission said that €1 in €5 was the headline figure to be spent, it was much less than this in reality. For 2021-27 there is a €610 billion envelope for climate-related actions. That is roughly €87 billion per year. On top of the MFF, which is the normal budgetary process, there is an exceptional instrument, the recovery and resilience facility. Again, a large chunk of that facility was allocated to funding climate-related actions. It was €275 billion. Again, we have issues on this. We issued a report last week where we found that the Commission tended to be a little optimistic when it categorises expenditure as green in terms of the coefficient it gives to it. There are different coefficients depending on whether they think it is very substantial and these can vary from 100% to zero. We found cases where we disagreed with the Commission. For instance, it had qualified certain items as 100% but in our view it was zero. These are challenges in making sure that green expenditure is really green.
The other important issue is that while it is an awful lot of money, meeting zero emissions by 2050 would mean having €1 trillion per year in the period 2021 to 2050. There is a big difference between the €87 billion - as I say, the RRF is once-off – and the €1 trillion per year. These are some of the kind of issues that were raised in the recent Draghi report which I am sure the members have all heard about.
On our role, chamber I is the one primarily, though not solely because in chamber II we have done a lot in the past, responsible. The focus has shifted more to climate. In the past we did a lot of work on inter-modal freight transport and all sorts of other transport issues. These things come in cycles. In essence, we follow the work programme of the Commission. We have independent audits where we look at how policy is being implemented. We take a sample of member states and try to identify challenges or risks they are facing so that other member states can take note of them and if there are good practices that they can also take those on board.
Some very ambitious targets have been set by the EU. This includes the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 55% compared with 1990 levels, and zero by 2050. The target is to reduce ETS emissions by 62% and non-ETS by 40% under the effort-sharing regulation. We have binding national targets in that regard. There is a target of at least 42% of renewable energy share by 2030 and to reduce the net land use, land use change, forestry, LULUCF, emissions by 310 Mt CO2 eq by 2030. These are all very ambitious targets. We are looking to see how the Commission is trying to address these in co-ordination with member states because, ultimately, many of the areas are in the competence of the member states.
In preparation for this meeting we looked at a couple of the reports that we wanted to highlight today, without going into too much detail. Ireland has not been selected as one of the member states of the four or five we go to, as I said. Nonetheless, we looked at Ireland’s climate action plan, CAP. At €165 billion over the period 2021 to 2030 it is significantly above the EU average. The CAP’s ambitious goals, including support for electrification and biomass adoption, are the kinds of things that are reflected in the reports we have done.
Turning to national targets, Ireland proposes to achieve a 51% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared with 2018 levels. In this context Ireland’s target is 42% by 2030 compared with 2005 levels. This comes from the effort-sharing regulation. In the carbon budget there is an allowance of 295 Mt CO2 eq for 2021 to 2025. That has been reduced to 200 Mt CO2 eq for 2026 to 2030. The aim is to have 80% renewable electricity share by 2030. Ireland has a binding target of reducing the LULUCF emissions by 0.626 million tonnes by 2030.
We looked at Ireland’s policies under the climate action plan. In it, we see things that link very nicely into the reports that we want to present. There is the hydrogen strategy for Ireland, EV action plan and infrastructure strategy, renewable transport, energy security and the electricity storage policy framework. These are elements of the climate action plan here. Some of the key reports we have issued in recent years on these areas include the sustainable biofuels in transport and on electrical recharging infrastructure. We issued a report on industrial policy on batteries, which is very interesting. They are all interlinked. The policy on batteries is linked in a way to the transition to electrical vehicles in terms of having the batteries to power them. We have reports on the circular economy, EU climate and energy targets and industrial policy on renewable hydrogen. The latter report was issued recently. From a transport perspective, we issued a report on road safety. This shows the broad nature of the audits we carry out. We are following issues that are of relevance to EU citizens. That is part of our role.
I will briefly look in detail at a couple of the reports. On infrastructure for electric-charging vehicles, DG MOVE in the Commission was our main auditee and we looked at projects in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. We concluded there were obstacles, including uneven charging station distribution, which is a problem across the EU as a whole. There is no EU-wide minimum infrastructure requirements. The lack of a strategic roadmap on this is something that is highlighted regularly.
Many of the initiatives are well intentioned but there does not seem to be a strategic roadmap which knits all these together.
Regarding funding, we say that the Connecting Europe Facility is not effectively targeting those areas with the greatest infrastructure needs. Then there are implementation delays by site selection and incomplete project outputs. We have made a number of recommendations in respect of updating the infrastructure to harmonise the whole thing to make sure people have access or know what they are doing. We need a harmonised approach to billing, for instance, for charging points and real-time information. It is basically about trying to create an environment, which will facilitate people to move more easily to electric cars. As the committee knows, the transport target was to be reduced by 90% by 2050 compared to 1990 and 25% of all greenhouse gases are coming from the transport sector. Of that, 72% is linked to road transport.
We looked to at the climate action plan as regards infrastructure and it already identifies a lot of these issues. It identifies the infrastructure that is needed and stated the fleet electrification will continue. It comes from the biofuels audit we did. There has been a heavy bet on the electric vehicles as the way forward. Biofuels will probably not have such a big role in road transport. We looked at the climate action plan and then the particular electric vehicle plan within that.
We were also trying to see how our findings in this report linked to what the Government is trying to do in its action plan. We can see a clear link between the findings we have, the challenges that are arising in other member states and what the Government has in its action plan which needs to be implemented. As I said, we have not looked at the implementation of the Irish climate action plan but it is already a positive that there is a plan there which addresses most of the findings we have made.
The next thing is biofuels and here again we say the Irish policy lacks stability. We went to four countries where the position of biofuel is more advanced, namely, Germany, France, Romania and Finland. Again, we are talking about the same kind of thing. Some €430 million was spent over the 2014 to 2020 period in research and promotion of biofuels but as there is a lack of certainty for investors, there is a delay in people wanting to invest in the sector. The policy and the legislation keep changing and the feedback we got is that there is no clear roadmap. There is also a question of capacity in terms of availability of biomass to make the biofuels. We have seen, for instance, in aviation, that the target for 2030 was 6% and yet the production at the moment is only roughly one tenth of that. As I say, there are challenges for biofuels particularly in making sure they are sustainable and not competing with food if we are using crops. There is a thing between food and fuel there. We have the biomass availability issue and an import dependence, which again is creating a situation which the whole idea was to try to avoid, that is, not to depending on imports from a third party. There are also issues of fraud regarding used cooking oil and things like that. Then we have the cost because generally it is quite an expensive way of doing things.
To sum up, for 2020, targets were set for 10% in road and rail and 14% in transport overall and the majority of member states missed these targets. Only seven actually matched them. One area in which there is a long way to go is advanced biofuels if we are going away from the crops. They are more sustainable but the 2030 target is to have 5% sourced from this country but at the moment it is only 0.8%. As the committee can see, the intentions are all very good but there an awful lot of challenges in reaching the different targets and this is covered in our conclusions and recommendations.
There is not much point spending much time on this next slide because what we have done is linked and it is the same outcome. We see that the same issues arising in all our audits are relevant for the Irish climate action plan too. We will move on.
Then we come to industrial policy on renewable hydrogen. This got a lot of attention when it was issued a few weeks ago across Europe because it is a very topical issue. We note conclusions and recommendations here but I will give a simple overview of our findings. For 2021 and 2027, the amount of money which will be invested here will be approximately €19 billion and 72% will come from the recovery and resilience facility. Very ambitious targets were set of 10 million tonnes of production and 10 million tonnes by imports. Regarding production, they now think they will be lucky to make 2.7 million tonnes by 2030 and there is no import strategy yet. There are problems here in respect of advancing hydrogen. Something we talked about earlier informally outside is this whole issue of making sure that on the one hand we want to make renewable hydrogen but we need renewable electricity to provide that. There is a challenge there in meeting the consumption demand of normal consumers and also, for instance, allowing people be on the grid 24-7. Another issue here is that hydrogen is very concentrated so far in the member states with a high share of hard-to-decarbonise industry. That is why they are in the sample. I refer to Germany, Spain, France and the Netherlands. What we said in the end is that there are three main issues that need to be addressed. These will be relevant for all member states and are: how to calibrate market incentives for renewable hydrogen production and use; how to prioritise scarce EU funding; and which parts of the value chain to focus on. This is very important. It relates to which industries the EU wants to keep and at what price. This is what we were talking about earlier about this constant challenge between industrial and green policy. Hydrogen so far accounted for less than 2% in 2022. It really has a long way to go.
We will move on. If we look at the intentions to collect national funding data, evaluate funding structures, establish an early innovation fund, develop a roadmap and review the hydrogen value chain - to which I just referred - all the elements are in the different plans. Now the proof will be in the pudding in how they are actually implemented.
The next thing is road safety, which is a slightly different area. We presented this report at a conference on road safety in Dublin Castle some time ago. Obviously, there is a huge issue in terms of the value of life. We have an objective to reduce road deaths to zero by 2050 and to halve them by 2030. Ireland has been quite successful in reducing deaths. Success is relative. There is still too many. This year, the indicative figures are that the numbers are on the way back up again so this is an issue on which an eye will have to be kept. There is some money that goes into this area. We looked at, not surprisingly, countries which have had high death rates. The death rate goes from the lowest in Sweden to the highest in Romania, where it is very high. We looked at Spain, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. As I said, Sweden was the lowest with 26 per million of inhabitants whereas for Romania the figure was 86. Ireland started at about 47 and we are down to 31 for 2022. I think it is going back up to about 37 for 2023.
While European roads are safe compared to many other regions, there are still too many people dying at more than 20,000 per year. The ambitious road safety goals are unlikely to be met and there are stark differences between member states. There is also an issue with how countries classify and report injuries, which can have a significant impact on the figures. Apparently, the criteria for being classified and reported as injured vary across the member states. In future, projects should place more of an emphasis on road safety as part of the selection criteria. This will be more problematic, though, as it appears that cohesion policy funding may decrease.
Where stronger financial supports for road safety and EU targets in promoting safe road use are concerned, we want Ireland to go from 144 to 72 by 2030. Ireland had the third lowest number of fatalities. It also had the fourth youngest car fleet, which is a help. However, it had the second highest jump in the 2022-23 period, with 2023 being the worst year in nearly a decade. We set interim targets for 2024 to reduce road deaths by 15% from 144 to 122 or lower, but as of August, we had already reported 120, so it is unlikely that the interim target will be met, unfortunately.
Climate is such a broad area and there are so many different regulations and acronyms that it is a complicated area to follow. The positives are shown on the left of the slide on display. There has been a decrease in emissions from electricity and greenhouse gases since 2022. On the other hand, Ireland s not on track to meet the target of a 51% reduction and the first two carbon budgets will not be met. The target of a 42% reduction by 2030 under the effort sharing regulation will not be met either. Ireland has the highest agricultural emission contribution. We also exceeded the effort sharing regulation’s emissions annual limit for 2023. These figures are coming directly from the Environmental Protection Agency. There are some positives, but there is still a long way to go, given what is shown on the right-hand side.
The next slide essentially shows what we have discussed. The only additional information has to do with the rate of circular material usage being on track to double by 2030 since 2020.
We need to promote our reports, as many people are not aware of the various reports that we produce and some of them could be useful to this or other Oireachtas committees. Our special report on organic farming was published two days ago. The CAP strategic plans, in which Ireland is a sample member state, will be next week. We will have reports on climate adaptation, urban pollution, sea water quality and forest wildfires. All of these are interesting topics and I hope the committee gets the opportunity to read the reports in the near future.
Looking forward, this is all about commitment. We do not want fatigue if we are to ensure that commitment levels are maintained. This will require a co-ordinated effort between member states and the EU. As the committee can imagine, the EU is facing a significant funding challenge, as other priorities have emerged since the last MFF: Ukraine; enlargement; and security and defence. These are all competing for the same funds unless member states are willing to increase their annual contributions, which I am unsure is the case at the moment. It would be difficult. There is also the option of borrowing, which happened with the RRF for the first time, but many member states, including Germany, believe that is not the way to go. From where will the money to pay for all of this come?
We are now working on our strategy and annual work programme for 2025 and beyond. Climate-related targets and issues will remain some of our key focuses in that period. Our annual report, which is more concerned with financial matters, will have a focus on climate action, primarily relating to CAP, and will be published on 10 October.
This meeting was an opportunity for us to showcase what we do. We are always willing to present on specific reports in more detail. We have invited Oireachtas committees previously and they have visited us in Luxembourg. This committee is more than welcome to do so and the people who carried out the work and know all of the technical background to them will present on the reports in detail.
I thank the Co-Chairs. I hope I did not go on for too long. The presentation was detailed, but this was our first opportunity to engage with the committee.