Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence debate -
Tuesday, 2 Jul 2024

Apologies have been received from Deputies Carthy and Berry. The purpose of our meeting is to consider the motion referred to the select committee by Dáil Éireann on the report by the Minister for Defence regarding service by the Defence Forces with the United Nations in 2023 and in relation to Ireland's participation in the two permanent structure co-operation PESCO projects and two European Defence Agency projects. I welcome the Tánaiste and Minister for Defence and his officials to the meeting.

The proposed format is that we will first hear the opening remarks from the Tánaiste on the report regarding service by the Defence Forces with the United Nations and then open the meeting up for questions. We will then proceed immediately to the Tánaiste's remarks on the two permanent structure co-operation PESCO projects and two European Defence Agency projects and then open it up for questions. Is that agreed? Agreed.

I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against any person or entity outside the House or an official by name. I call on the Tánaiste to make his first opening statement on service by the Defence Forces with the United Nations.

I am pleased to report to the committee on Irish Defence Forces participation in United Nations missions in 2023. This report was laid before Dáil Éireann on 3 May 2024. The following motion was placed on the Order Paper for Dáil Éireann and has been referred to this committee:

That Dáil Éireann approves:

...

(II) the report by the Minister for Defence regarding service by the Defence Forces with the United Nations in 2023, a copy of which was laid before Dáil Éireann on 3 May 2024, in accordance with Section 13 of the Defence (Amendment) Act, 2006.

In commending the motion, I will briefly outline some of the key aspects of Ireland's involvement with the UN in 2023. At the same time, I will also touch on some of the current developments ongoing in the region.

Irish troops were first deployed on UN peacekeeping operations in 1958 and since then have had a continuous record of participation in UN peace support operations. This is a unique record and one of which this country is rightly proud. Defence Forces personnel have served in peace support missions all over the world in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America, completing more than 73,000 tours of duty to date. This commitment to international peacekeeping is a very practical expression of the values which we hold dear as a nation, and of our commitment to international peace and security and to multilateralism.

As of 5 June 2024, there are some 430 Defence Forces personnel serving overseas in eight different missions around the world. The main mission in which personnel are currently deployed is the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL. We also have other postings in the Middle East and the Balkans. For all these Irish men and women of the Defence Forces deployed on these operations, service with the United Nations is rightly regarded as a noble and important contribution in supporting Ireland's place in the world and our international and foreign policy objectives.

Moving to the report for 2023, the subject of this motion, Ireland's main commitments during 2023 were to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, UNDOF, on the Golan Heights. The UNIFIL mission was Ireland's largest overseas deployment during 2023. The current contingent is part of a joint interoperable Irish-Polish battalion, which also includes a contingent from Hungary and personnel from Malta. Ireland acts as lead nation, providing the commanding officer and the larger troop and logistics contribution to the joint battalion.

Since the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October of last year and the war that has followed, there has been an increased focus on the crucial work carried out by Irish peacekeepers in the Middle East. I visited our troops in UNIFIL last month to show Government and the Irish people's support and appreciation for the role our troops carry out in south Lebanon, and while there saw for myself some of the dangers under which they operate while carrying out their mission. I remain deeply concerned by rising tensions in that area. The potential for further regional escalation remains high, and a widening of this conflict would have devastating consequences for all in the region, most particularly those living in proximity to the blue line between Israel and Lebanon.

It is vital that all parties work to de-escalate the situation, and with regard to the conflict in Gaza, we continue to urgently call for an immediate and sustainable humanitarian ceasefire, the unconditional release of all hostages and for full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access. Accountability for all civilian deaths is essential. In this unstable climate in which our Defence Forces personnel are serving, the health and safety of these personnel remains of paramount concern to both myself and to the Government at this time.

I remain in regular and ongoing contact with the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces on this matter. Both he and my Department are kept regularly apprised of all developments in those areas in which Defence Forces' personnel are deployed. In terms of protecting our troops on the ground, ongoing threat assessments are carried out in mission areas and we continually review both personal equipment and force assets to ensure that Defence Forces personnel are appropriately equipped to fulfil their roles and stay safe. It is important also to note that Defence Forces’ peacekeepers are well trained prior to deployment, including anticipating events such as occasions of sporadic fire in their area of operations, and including the circumstances in which they find themselves currently, which may require taking shelter in protected positions.

Earlier this year, I approved the deployment of an extra platoon of 33 Irish troops to serve as an additional force protection element with the Irish battalion in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, and it is intended that they will deploy later this month. In terms of any contingency planning around this deployment given the instability in the region, I would stress that planning of this nature is part and parcel of all UN and national operational deployments.

Given the ongoing security issues in this region, contingency planning is ongoing should the need for an evacuation arise. I would add however that the Government remains committed to our missions in the Middle East, including UNIFIL, and the Government has no plans to evacuate our personnel currently. As members will be aware however, the situation remains highly fluid and is one that we are continuing to keep a close eye on.

Moving to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, UNDOF, mission in the Golan Heights, this was Ireland’s second largest overseas deployment in 2023. A contingent of the Permanent Defence Force was deployed in UNDOF since 2013, and as of 31 December 2023, a total of 134 Defence Forces personnel were serving with the mission. Following a joint assessment by the Department and the Defence Forces of commitments to overseas missions and on the basis of military advice, the decision was taken in 2023 to withdraw the infantry group from the mission with effect from April 2024. This decision was taken in order for the Defence Forces to undertake a process of consolidation with regard to their overseas commitments and to prepare for future peacekeeping missions.

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the infantry group, the United Nations agreed that Ireland will continue to hold three staff officer appointments with the mission. Ireland will continue to support the UN in its work with the UNDOF mission into the future. I will take this opportunity to pay tribute the Defence Forces’ remarkable peacekeeping record with the mission since they were first deployed. Over the period of their deployment, our peacekeepers played an important part in improving the lives of citizens on the ground in the Golan Heights, but that torch has now passed to peacekeeping troops from Kazakhstan, who replaced the Irish troops from April of this year.

I move now to UNTSO, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East. This mission is responsible for providing trained, unarmed military observers to support the work of the two other UN missions in the Middle East – UNIFIL and UNDOF. The Defence Forces have participated in UNTSO since 1958, supporting the work of the other UN peacekeeping operation by monitoring ceasefires and supervising armistice agreements. As of 31 December 2023, a total of 12 members of the Permanent Defence Force were serving with the mission and I would also like to place on the record my and the Government’s appreciation of the efforts of Irish troops in this regard.

Other United Nations mandated missions in which Defence Forces personnel were deployed in 2023 are the European Union-led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR, with five personnel; the NATO-led international security presence in Kosovo, KFOR, with 13 personnel; and the Naval Service European Union Naval Mission, Operation Irini, with six personnel. Ireland has a strong tradition of principled engagement on development, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, human rights and peacekeeping. These values underpin our commitment to partnership with the United Nations and its member states.

I commend all our Defence Forces men and women on their commitment and dedication to overseas service, without which Ireland’s strong tradition of peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations would not be possible.

Peacekeeping is not without risks however, and this was brought shockingly home to all of us in December 2022, with the killing of Private Seán Rooney while serving in south Lebanon. A number of his colleagues from the 121st Battalion were also injured. A judicial process in this regard is ongoing in Lebanon, and both the Government and I have consistently expressed determination that all of the facts and circumstances of the incident are fully established and that no stone is left unturned to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. I am determined to see that justice is done, and be seen to be done, not just for Private Rooney’s family, but also for his colleagues and for Ireland as a whole. To this end, a central focus of my visit to Lebanon in May was my meeting with the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which representatives of the Lebanese Minister for Defence also attended. I left the Lebanese authorities in no doubt with regard to the absolute determination of the Irish Government in ensuring that those responsible for Private Rooney’s death are brought to justice and that the lives of Irish peacekeepers are valued. We should never forget that participation in all these peace support, crisis management training and monitoring missions comes at a personal cost for individuals and their families and friends.

Ár gcoimeádaithe síochána in Óglaigh na hÉireann atá ag fónamh thar lear agus ar fud na cruinne faoi láthair, slán abhaile go dtaga siad níos déanaí i mbliana tar éis dóibh a gcuairt dualgais thar lear a chríochnú. Táimid ag smaoineamh orthu i gcónaí agus gabhaim buíochas leo as a gcuid seirbhíse. Molaim don choiste go nglacfaí leis an rún. I commend the motion to the committee.

Before going to Deputy Cronin, I join the Tánaiste in his tribute to our Defence Forces and the role they have played for many years in the most challenging of arenas, circumstances and regions since they were first deployed. As public representatives, we reflect the warm appreciation of the Irish people towards members of our Defence Forces serving overseas.

I welcome the Tánaiste. I also wish to be associated with his words on Private Seán Rooney. Ar dheis Dé go raibh sé.

I have a few questions for the Tánaiste on the UN report. How many Defence Forces personnel served abroad as part of the United Nations mandated missions in 2019 and 2023? How many does the Tánaiste expect to serve abroad in 2024 and 2025?

I do not have the figures for 2019 immediately to hand. I will get them for the Deputy shortly. A figure of 1,509 personnel served during 2023. That has people coming between the two six-month rotations. As of 5 June 2024, Ireland contributes 430 Defence Forces personnel to overseas missions and locations, which reflects the Government's continued commitment to our responsibilities in the area of international peace and security. The main mission is UNIFIL, with 344 personnel. Every six months, a new group of 344 comes out. We had 130 in UNDOF for the first half of 2023. That is about 470. We have 13 in KFOR and six in IRINI and five in EUFOR-Althea. I will come back to the Deputy on the figures for 2019. We are sending a further 33 out. The difference, once UNDOF ceases, 30 more will go to UNIFIL, which is a net 100 fewer, but 185 are joining the battle group. We will end up with more deployed, albeit not on peacekeeping missions.

Many members of the battle group will be stationed domestically for much of the first phase of that endeavour.

In the opening statement, the Tánaiste said UNDOF withdrawal stems from "a joint assessment by the Department and the Defence Forces ... for the Defence Forces to undertake a process of consolidation ... to prepare for future peacekeeping missions". Was the requirement to participate in the EU battle group part of the terms of reference of that joint assessment?

No, although it is a factor. Shortly after I became Minister for Defence, I received strong military advice from the Chief of Staff recommending that we pull out of UNDOF. I think he would have been aware of my decision to enter the battle group because we are part of the CSDP missions. I am very clear about that role for Ireland in terms of-----

No. I was advised anyway. The advice was coming because these are two different types of missions. If we are honest, they are not comparable at all in some respects. We first deployed there in 2013 and 3,000 troops have served overall. It is not unusual for us to give ten years or more to a given place. The one place where we have been more or less continuously, with one interruption early in the 2000s, I think, is in Lebanon with UNIFIL. We have been to Chad and did good work there previously. We have also been in Liberia. We keep our options open, therefore, in terms of potential future peacekeeping missions. Part of this undertaking is that we withdraw and consolidate. We are freeing up personnel as well through-----

Okay. The Tánaiste talked about the "increased focus on the crucial work [of our Defence Forces] in the Middle East" post 7 October. Was the decision revisited or reconsidered in that context? What future peacekeeping missions are the Defence Forces currently preparing for and what stage is planning at? Is the Government in active discussions with the UN in relation to any pending deployments?

We are not in active discussion. The most immediate action in this context has been the deployment of an additional platoon of 33 personnel to go to Lebanon on top of the 344 troops we have there now. This is the immediate focus at the moment. We keep the situation under review. If the UN comes to us with a specific request, we will, of course, consider it.

Okay. As we review the deployment of Defence Forces personnel overseas, I ask the Tánaiste to outline his intentions regarding the removal of the triple lock, which is the neutrality protection mechanism we have. What are the proposals to approve overseas deployment if the need for the UN mandate is successfully removed in the context of the triple lock?

I must reassert the point that there is no connection between the triple lock and our military neutrality. Our military neutrality means that we are not members of a military alliance and we have no plans to be a member of a military alliance. The triple lock refers to a three-stage process to approve the deployment of troops on a peacekeeping mission. At the moment, this involves the approval of the UN Security Council, in essence, the Government and the Dáil. In future, in the amendment to the triple lock, we propose that we would still frame it in a UN framework in the context of the UN Charter, the principles of the UN and the various chapters of the UN framework governing deployments.

I will be honest. The intention is to get it to the Government before the recess. I am conscious that the Oireachtas recess is only two weeks away. We may make that, but it is tight. If we do not make that, it will be the first week of September. However, we have Government meetings until the end of July so I may make it before the summer recess in that context. In any event, it will fall for pre-legislative scrutiny by this committee.

On my last visit to Lebanon about a month ago, I met the minister for foreign affairs because I am not happy with the progress being made on this case. The legal adviser to the minister for defence was at the meeting because the minister for defence was ill in hospital and could not be there. I have since written to the Lebanese foreign minister because of the case again being postponed until next February, which is deeply unsatisfactory. This is the seventh adjournment of the trial. The key suspect was not in attendance for this trial or the last one because of illness. That is what we have been informed. The others have remained at large from the beginning. It is not satisfactory.

Peacekeepers and their role should be valued and the Lebanese judicial system should reflect the valuing of peacekeepers, especially those who lose their lives in the course of duty. I have made clear my unhappiness with what is transpiring. We have legal representatives in an observer capacity, but obviously they cannot participate.

There will be a coroner's inquest, probably during the week of 23 July. An Garda Síochána did extensive work on this that will feed into the coroner's inquest. That is the position as of now.

As I said, I have also written to the UN pointing out that I am anxious for it to become proactive in this case. It concluded its own board of inquiry report, which it provided to Ireland for official use only and it has insisted that it not be shared with third parties or made public in any form either in whole or in part. That is a UN requirement. The investigation by An Garda Síochána for the purpose of preparing a report for the coroner is complete and the Defence Forces supported that investigation. That is the up-to-date position.

The next hearing is scheduled for 12 February 2025. This is deeply unsatisfactory.

It is. I agree. Is there any intention to extend the mandate of Operation Irini, which is due to run until next March? In the Dáil and by means of parliamentary questions, I have raised with the Tánaiste my concerns regarding the Libyan Coast Guard. Have any efforts been made to ensure that we will not see a repeat of the issues that came to light in respect of the Libyan Coast Guard?

At present, it is primarily tasked with supporting the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya. The operation is important. The secondary tasks involve implementing UN measures against illicit exports of petroleum from Libya and capacity building and training the Libyan Coast Guard and navy in disrupting the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks. In any event, there are currently no ongoing activities in the secondary task of capacity building and training to the Libyan Coast Guard, so they have stopped that. Being honest, it does not have the specific mandate on rescue, but if they come across a very distressed situation, they will intervene.

At a European level, there has been a strategic assessment of the mission. A decision will be made at European level as to the continuation of the mission. We have six members on it. They are stationed at the operational headquarters in Rome and are serving in staff officer posts. In the summer of 2023, 58 personnel were deployed as part of Operation Irini for a period of six weeks. I was advised at the time by the Naval Service that it would be able to do it. I will have to review any request about this matter closer to the time. I am of the view that we need to strengthen the Naval Service. We must ensure it is sufficiently strengthened in terms of dealing with domestic duties.

I welcome the Tánaiste and thank him for his statement. I join him in recognising the work being carried out abroad by Defence Forces personnel.

In the context of UNIFIL, as the Tánaiste stated, tensions have heightened recently. There was a meeting yesterday with humanitarian agencies in respect of the civilian communities out there. UNIFIL was involved in that as well. The Tánaiste might comment on the impact that those escalating tensions are having on the civilian communities in the area. I visited the place several years ago and I was struck by the relationship that had built between Irish troops and civilians on the ground. It was very positive and warm, and our troops were really accepted. The killing of Private Rooney and the wounding of the other soldiers was totally out of character, particularly in view of the relationship between our troops and the civilian population. The civilians are currently under pressure as a result of the rising tensions. Has the Tánaiste picked up on anything in that regard?

In an earlier period, relationships with local communities in Tebnine and places like that were very strong. However, our troops are no longer stationed in these areas. In the past, a different approach was adopted in terms of the configuration in barracks and so on. It was almost a community-based approach.

Hezbollah has heightened tensions deliberately, in our view, in terms of its positioning vis-à-vis the role of UNIFIL, particularly with respect to activities near the Blue Line. It seems to us that Hezbollah is anxious to restrict the capacity of UNIFIL to observe what is happening on the ground in the context of its operations and so on. The tensions in Gaza have meant an intensity to the firing of rockets on both sides to such an extent that thousands of Israelis have had to leave and are now living in cities in Israel. Up to 50,000 or 60,000 Lebanese have left the area. UNIFIL is now in the middle of an area that has been significantly depopulated because of this limited military activity. Much of the farming land on the Lebanese side of the border has been destroyed by phosphorous and so forth. That means it will be almost impossible for some of those families to go back and farm anytime soon. That is the position in respect of the local communities.

At the Foreign Affairs Council last Monday, concerns were expressed about heightening tensions. The French and the US have to varying degrees been endeavouring to broker a solution between Hezbollah and Israel to prevent an all-out war. No matter who you listen to, and we have our own information, there is no doubt but that tensions have been heightened.

As I say, the relationship is not as it once was. There are still good relationships but Hezbollah has been trying to portray UNIFIL more generally, and not just the Irish contingent, as supportive of Israel. Some crude assertions have been made in that regard. The Lebanese authorities are at pains to point out that is not the case but we are dealing with a state that is nearing virtual collapse. No president has been appointed and an interim caretaker Government is in place. Inflation has increased exponentially and the central bank has had a crisis. There has been a port explosion. We are in a situation whereby Europe and others are trying to support the Lebanese army with more resources and pay. It is a very difficult environment overall.

Almost all of our civilians are on a register. We have given travel advice to the effect that they should leave Lebanon and we have urged Irish civilians to do so. We will continue to do that by commercial means while it is still possible. I reiterated that advice on 27 June. The Department of Foreign Affairs is in regular contact with those registered Irish citizens who remain in Lebanon. Many of them are long-term residents and do not plan to leave unless the situation deteriorates significantly. We work with our partners within the EU and the United Kingdom to prepare the ground for any potential evacuation. That work is advanced. I will continue to work with the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces and the Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs. I am taking a structured approach to that situation. That is where we are.

The Tánaiste indicated earlier that we are prepared to evacuate our troops if we have to in the event of serious hostilities breaking out. We hope that does not happen. If hostilities break out between Hezbollah and Israel, it would be a catastrophe. I understand that Hezbollah is more powerful than Hamas.

Will the Tánaiste comment on the Syrian refugees in Lebanon? Have we any idea how many are still there? Are they having an impact on the economy? Have we any interaction with them, to the Tánaiste's knowledge?

There are approximately 1.5 million Syrians in Lebanon. That is creating tensions. I have been to Lebanon on a number of occasions in the past year and invariably the issue is raised by the foreign minister that the European Union and others are saying that Syrians in Lebanon are not in a position to go back to Syria because it is not safe for them.

The Lebanese counter by saying it is safe for them. One has to acknowledge that in a population of 5 million, 1.5 million is an enormous number of migrants to absorb and work with. UNRWA is vital in all of this. More generally, migration pressures on countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt are simply enormous, which is sometimes not appreciated in this part of the world. As Syria starts to stabilise, the EU position is that Syrians are not in a position to go to it back right now because they believe it is not safe for them to go back.

The previous question was about-----

I was asking about Syria. It was interesting to hear the Tánaiste comment on the pressures on Lebanon, the number of Syrian refugees there and the fact that they cannot go back. This leads me to my next question. We are talking about the Golan Heights, the situation in Syria and how that is affecting the UN's presence in Lebanon.

You have a lot of militia groups, the government of Syria, a lot of proxies and various neighbouring countries with significant interests such as Iran, Israel, the US or, dare I say it, Russia. It is very challenging. The situation seems to be a long way from any kind of stable resolution. Türkiye is another neighbour that has interests there. Everyone is protecting their own interests but there is a lot of weaponry, trafficking and mischief making in terms of neighbouring states. I visited Jordan, which is coming under a lot of pressure with various drug and weapon trafficking being attempted through its border. It is a force of destabilisation, considerable violence, outbreaks of violence, explosions and so on in the region. It is a very dangerous zone that is causing immense destabilisation in the region.

The Deputy mentioned evacuations. UNIFIL will make a decision on that, although we should remember that this is a very difficult scenario. UNIFIL is there to keep the peace - not to flee at the first moment of trouble. That is the challenge. We have had previous episodes globally that led to horrors when there was either a premature or unplanned evacuation. I am conscious that modern warfare is of far greater severity and intensity today that it would have been even five or ten years ago. That is something I am conscious of. We think of the levelling of Syria, including Aleppo, and the same kind of war in Gaza where the place was levelled. It was the same in Ukraine where civilian and energy infrastructure was destroyed. Two thousand pound bombs have been dropped in Gaza, which is a small area the size of County Louth or thereabouts. It is horrific to contemplate the impact of that on civilians. While the presence of UNIFIL is a significant deterrent, we will keep that under very careful review and, again, work with colleagues. You have to plan for every scenario but fundamentally peacekeeping troops are there to keep the peace and to prevent outbreaks of war. Ultimately, UNIFIL has to make a call on those issues.

In terms of the reserve forces, one member of the Reserve Defence Force has been deployed on a voluntary basis in support of the Permanent Defence Force. There is a lot of keenness to participate. There is no reluctance on behalf of members of the Defence Forces to participate overseas generally speaking. When I was out there, it was very heartening to hear members of our Defence Forces speak about the challenges.

As a layperson, I would have said it must be more challenging now and it is because of rockets being fired across and over them and gunfire not far away. In fact, it can be very close at times. They will say very uniformly that while they find it challenging, this is what they were trained for and the idea of their training being put into practice in a very real way. I was heartened by their response to what is a much more difficult scenario than any recent battalion has experienced.

Unless Deputies Cronin or Stanton have any other issues to raise with the Tánaiste on the matter of service with the UN by the Defence Forces in 2023, I propose that we move on. I ask the Tánaiste to make his opening statement on the Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, projects and two European Defence Agency, EDA, projects.

The following motion has been placed on the Order Paper for Dáil Éireann and was referred to this committee:

That Dáil Éireann approves Ireland's participation in the following:

(i) two Permanent Structured Cooperation Projects in accordance with the Programme for Government commitment:

(a) Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations, and

(b) Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection and the associated Category B European Defence Agency support to the project, and

(ii) two European Defence Agency projects pursuant to section 2 of the Defence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009:

(a) Defence Energy Managers' Course II, and

(b) Cyber Defence Exercises...

I am happy to attend the committee today to outline what is being proposed, and most importantly, why this is being proposed. In a geopolitically insecure climate such as today’s, it is important that Ireland makes the best use that we can of opportunities provided by our membership of multilateral fora where such co-operation can be beneficial to us in terms of developing our military’s capabilities. A key example of this co-operation in the security and defence field is Ireland’s membership of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, and availing of opportunities that arise from that. As the outcomes and interventions at least year’s Consultative Forum on International Security Policy showed, there is a realisation that Ireland’s engagement on the issue of our own security and defence will benefit from increased focus and investment. There is also an understanding that as a country, we should maximise our engagement at global level on these issues. During the forum, many contributors expressed a clear view in favour of working more closely with our international partners at UN level, in the EU and via the Partnership for Peace.

As the committee knows, Ireland’s policy of military neutrality, as practised by successive Governments over many decades, means that we do not participate in military alliances or common or mutual defence arrangements. This Government has no plans to alter that policy. It does not mean we either wish to, or can, isolate ourselves from the challenging security environment we find ourselves in today nor does it mean we can ignore our responsibilities towards our own citizens or other international partners. I think we can all agree that today’s global security climate with its ensuing threats to democracy and multilateralism and the emergence of the largest land conflict on the European continent since World War II is deeply concerning.

At the moment, Europe is under attack by forces hostile to democracy, hostile to the rule of law and hostile to the right of states to independent self-determination. Despite its beneficial geographic location, Ireland is not immune to that and to related threats, as evidenced by incidents in our territorial waters over the recent past. The memberships of vital networks of bilateral and multilateral partnerships, particularly as an EU member state, and the flexibility needed to maintain them within our policy of military neutrality that we currently enjoy assist us in developing the capabilities we need. There is a recognition nationally that we face new and emerging threats. We are increasingly aware of the havoc that can be wreaked by malicious actors in cyberspace, a reality brought home very powerfully by the cyberattack on the HSE in 2021. The only way to deal with cyber threats is by working with others in collaborating and pooling information and expertise.

At the same time, our geographic situation as an island in the Atlantic forces us to confront vulnerabilities in our offshore infrastructure. One only has to look at what happened to Finland and Estonia when the gas connector and interconnector were sabotaged last year.

Our participation in collaborative EU projects provides us with the ability to use opportunities to address these challenges, and to benefit from best practice and expertise from other member states.

It is important to reiterate that participation in EDA or PESCO projects or engagement with any other EU defence-related initiative under the Common Security and Defence Policy does not have any impact on Ireland's policy of military neutrality. In addition, participation in EDA and PESCO projects assists our Defence Forces in developing the necessary capabilities for all the roles assigned to them by Government, including their international peacekeeping roles. It is in this context that I intend to seek approval to join a number of further PESCO and EDA projects, in the logistics, critical seabed infrastructure protection, environmental management and cyber areas, all of which have been deliberately chosen, following appropriate military advice, to enhance the capability of our Defence Forces.

In commending this motion to the select committee, I will outline Ireland's engagement to date in PESCO and in the European Defence Agency, and the background to the four projects that Ireland wishes to participate in. Given the value of each project, it is important that I give some time to each of them. In summary, PESCO is a framework under which groups of member states of the European Union come together to plan, develop and invest in shared capability projects and enhance the operational readiness and development of their respective armed forces. Participation in PESCO is entirely voluntary, and of the EU member states all but Malta take part in projects under this framework. Its objective is to enable co-operation among member states that will deliver capabilities for national and international missions and operations.

Ireland's participation was agreed by Government and approved by Dáil Éireann on 11 December 2017. The current programme for Government provides that Ireland's participation in PESCO projects will be maintained on an opt-in basis, with contributions being entirely voluntary. The programme for Government further provides that participation in PESCO projects will be subject to the approval of the Government and Dáil Éireann. We currently participate in four PESCO projects, which is at the lower level of engagement compared to other EU countries. Each PESCO project that we join must align with the Defence Forces' capability development requirements, and hence each project undergoes an analysis for how it can deliver for the Defence Forces' capabilities prior to a decision to join.

The European Defence Agency is an agency of the European Union composed of defence Ministers of the 27 participating member states. It was established 20 years ago to "support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future". The agency is focused on assisting member states in capability development, in obtaining better value for existing member state defence expenditure, and in improving competitiveness and securing greater efficiency, particularly in the areas of research, technology and procurement. The primary reason that Ireland joined the agency in 2004 is to support the development of the Defence Forces' capabilities for peacekeeping and international crisis management operations.

I will now go into detail on each of the projects proposed. The first is the PESCO project network of logistic hubs in Europe and support to operations. The main aim of this project is to support and improve strategic logistic support and force protection in EU missions and operations. The benefits to Ireland's participation are twofold. First, and most importantly, participation will have clear benefits in respect to Ireland's participation in the 2025 EU battle group in terms of assisting with the deployment, storage and efficient transport of Defence Forces assets as part the battle group training and exercise process. In very straightforward terms, the Defence Forces will need to bring our kit and equipment to the Continent as part of our participation in the battle group and this project allows us to make use of existing transport and storage facilities. It will provide us with access to a logistics hub where our vehicles and equipment can be safely stored and easily accessed to use during the battle group exercises in 2024 and 2025. We are currently an observer in this project, but observers cannot benefit from the project, hence the move to seek full membership.

Second, there are potentially longer-term benefits to Ireland's participation. As I touched on at the outset, the geopolitical situation in Europe and its hinterland is changing at a rapid and uncertain pace. Participating in this project will also give Ireland potential options when deploying and withdrawing from missions overseas. If troops need to be withdrawn from a location quickly and there is an EU logistics hub close to the mission, it could provide valuable support to the Defence Forces.

Participation in this project will also enhance the Defence Forces' capability and knowledge in major logistical deployment, sustainment and withdrawal from operations. The project is led by Cyprus, France and Germany, and has 14 participating member states. The only costs associated with joining this project are in relation to attendance at meetings and workshops.

The second PESCO project, on critical seabed infrastructure protection, is an opportunity for us to build capability to address identified risks and areas of vulnerability, as I touched on at the outset of my speech. This project aims to enhance co-operation among EU member states in monitoring, securing, and defending critical seabed infrastructure against various threats, including sabotage, terrorism and espionage. This involves developing capabilities for surveillance, reconnaissance, and response in maritime environments, as well as fostering information sharing and co-ordination among participating member states.

For the first time, the latest national risk assessment for Ireland identifies damage to undersea infrastructure as a key national level risk. Participation in this project allows us to address and mitigate this risk somewhat, as the project will facilitate strengthening capabilities with regard to protecting critical undersea infrastructure, thereby increasing the security and resilience of this infrastructure. The project will look at current and future technologies to inform capability development that could be used to mitigate threats to critical seabed infrastructure. It will also provide opportunities for exercises and training activities.

The EDA also offers several forms of support to PESCO projects, including the use of EDA's project management tools and administrative support, and this PESCO project will seek support from the EDA in this regard. This support will be captured under a separate EDA project, and is provided by the agency at no additional cost to member states. Participating member states will also formally sign an agreement with the EDA in this regard. As well as the PESCO project, therefore, I will also seek Dáil approval to join the associated EDA project supporting this. Currently, the only costs associated with this project are in respect of the Defence Forces' attendance at meetings and workshops, and these costs will be met from within existing resources.

The third project I will seek Dáil approval to join is the European Defence Agency's Defence Energy Managers Course II. This project is of an environmental nature and its main aim is to increase knowledge and to improve energy management in the military, resulting in benefits in terms of energy consumption, cost, and CO2 emission reductions across the military estate. Its key objectives are to educate participants, and to have those participants then disseminate that knowledge throughout their militaries. The project will provide tailored training on energy management systems and will include onsite visits to ensure each member states' requirements are taken into account.

The participation of the Defence Forces in this project will enhance their knowledge of better managing energy in military installations and how to structure an effective energy management programme. Personnel will also learn how to continuously improve energy performance involving effective management, planning, design, procurement, dual-use research, monitoring and measurement. This project presents a significant opportunity to enhance the Defence Forces' energy management efforts.

There will be two courses available per year to participants and each place on the course is at a cost of €5,000. The Defence Forces have indicated there is a requirement to train four to six personnel per year. There is also a one-off cost in the first year of the project of €1,500 per member state. This will contribute to ongoing update and refinement of the training material and the development of a tool to measure energy savings achieved by the participating military installation after the completion of the course. The duration of this project is five years and it will be renewed automatically for a further five years unless the contributing members decide otherwise. Approval is requested for Ireland to join the project and to continue to participate in it should it be extended beyond the initial five years. To date, four other member states have indicated that they are interested in joining the project, namely, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Slovenia.

The final project I intend to seek Dáil approval to join is the EDA cyber defence exercises project. Cyber defence is something we need to enhance in our country but it is not something we can do on our own. We need to collaborate with partners. We live in a digital world of unparalleled connectivity where borders are irrelevant. This project allows our Defence Forces' experts to gain insight into cyber threats experienced by other member states and, importantly, learn from these in an effort to mitigate any national attacks.

The main aim of this project is to strengthen co-operation of cyber defence education, training and exercises among the participating member states. It also focuses on building confidence and improving information sharing among participating member states while harmonising the education, training and exercise programs across the EU member states and improving the knowledge, skills and abilities of personnel for missions and operations. Participation in this project will give our Defence Forces personnel access to cyber defence education, training and exercises. Access to these will improve the knowledge, skills, and experience of cyber personnel in the Defence Forces. It will also improve information sharing to identify threats and assist with responding to cyberattacks.

This is an umbrella project. It is the lead project on cyber training within the EDA. It will plan, co-ordinate and execute future cyber defence exercises. Each cyber defence exercise developed under this project will be established as a subproject. Approval to participate in this project will also include participation in the umbrella project and any relevant cyber defence exercise that will be established under that. Each exercise and training opportunity will be analysed and assessed against the Defence Forces capability requirement. Depending on the scope of certain exercises, there may also be an opportunity to include the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications and the National Cyber Security Centre, allowing for cross-governmental learning. All EDA participating member states have indicated their interest in joining this project. There is no financial cost to Ireland joining.

In summary, all the projects I have outlined today will contribute to enhancing the Defence Forces’ capabilities in support of the roles assigned to the Defence Forces by Government, and as set out in the White Paper on Defence in 2015 and its 2019 update. Furthermore, the report of the Commission on the Defence Forces recognises that engagement in the EDA and PESCO are increasingly important and that the opportunities for the enhancement of military capability development that are offered through these should be fully exploited.

The projects cover a wide range of capabilities, many of which will also benefit our national requirements and national mitigation of threats. In particular, threats with regard to cyber and undersea infrastructure are high on the list of Government’s priorities, as are environmental concerns. Education on sustainable energy and how to apply that education at military installations at home and abroad is an absolute requirement as we move towards a more energy-sustainable way of doing our business.

With regard to our overseas deployments, the safe deployment and withdrawal of our troops from missions and exercises is of utmost importance. Given the fragile geopolitical environment currently, there is also a need to maximise opportunities in the context of how we can contribute to our existing commitments, as well availing of opportunities to co-operate with partners and existing projects where we may need to move our troops and equipment. Indeed, it would be remiss of us not to explore these opportunities.

Our relationship with the EDA and PESCO affords us this opportunity to lean in on these priority areas. These are all very strong projects that should be supported. On that basis, I commend the motion to the select committee.

I want to state again our objections to the process by means of which the Tánaiste is doing this. The committee indicated to him last July that we would like more engagement and that we might have the opportunity to bring experts in, talk to them about it and have a back-and-forth, not just a 55-minute debate in the Dáil. I will start with that.

On the PESCO project network relating to logistic hubs in Europe and support in operations, how do the Defence Forces currently deploy logistically, as opposed to what participation in the project allows for? I am talking about the sheer scale of it, and Ireland being an island off the coast Europe. With regard to the existing transport and storage facilities available under the project, can the Tánaiste outline what is in place? Does he envisage that there is going to be any possibility that under this project, Ireland could opt to, or be obliged to in another case, host any of these transport and storage facilities?

This is voluntary opt-in. I want to say overall that "No" is the answer to that - an emphatic "No". We will be under no obligations. These are opt-in and on a voluntary basis, as I said, but I do think we need to. The Deputy suggested that she is objecting to the process here. Government has to take decisions in the normal course of events, and the Oireachtas has to take decisions. This is not rocket science at one level. There may be political arguments and ideology around this but I would have to strongly resist that assertion. The idea that we need experts to decide whether we participate, along with other states, in an education programme on energy management in our military installations is, to me, bonkers. I just do not get it. One of the projects here is €5,000 per member and €1,500 to join the project. I take the point on some other schemes, maybe, but these ones are fairly basic.

I think all the hype and noise around PESCO has been overdone. Historically, our participation in PESCO since we joined has been low. I was taken aback when I became Minister for Defence and I asked officials what we were involved. There is precious little despite all the shouting and roaring in Dáil Éireann that we are going to jettison our military neutrality and join somebody. It is all nonsense, in real terms. We need to get a grip as a country and a society. We are not joining NATO or a military alliance but we are part of a European civil-----

My point is that what PESCO is about is improving our capabilities. The EDA is about improving our capabilities. On issues like cybersecurity and undersea cables, collaboration is the name of the game. Why? The reason is that there is a lot of expertise about the place and we have to share knowledge. When the HSE was attacked, two of the first countries that contacted us - and I was Taoiseach at the time - were Poland and the United Kingdom. Why? The reason was that Poland had a similar attack from the same group in Russia.

Countries share knowledge around cybersecurity. When I met Richard Browne of the National Cyber Security Centre, he said collaboration is the only way that countries can be resilient against cyberattacks. We have to work together both to alert each other about the attacks we have experienced and the methodologies deployed to try to thwart them. There is a centre called the NATO Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. It is not actually owned by NATO but Estonia runs it. We now have a person out there on rotation from the military. Why? I went there and what I saw on the board was a question about how you defend against an attack on your water utility system by cybersecurity threats. These are vital to the lives of our citizens. We cannot do it on our own and in isolation. I apologise to the Deputy but I am railing against a certain narrative that any attempt by Ireland to engage with any other member state of Europe is almost tantamount to sacrificing neutrality. I would have to strongly say it is not. We must be robust about the importance of collaboration, co-operation, sharing of knowledge and all of that.

Even having said that, our level of participation in all of this is quite on the lower side, if one takes on board all the commentary on it. Anyway, I have got that off my chest.

On the logistic hubs, we do not have to join any logistic hubs but we do see value here. Say we were on a peacekeeping mission and we had to evacuate quickly. The idea of having a hub, or being part of a logistics hub on the European mainland, could be advantageous to safe and more rapid evacuation. That is why, I think, our military personnel were anxious to join this particular project. It made a lot of sense.

As regards PESCO and critical seabed infrastructure protection, the Tánaiste outlined that this project would help address identified risks and areas of vulnerability as regards critical seabed infrastructure. Will he outline the establishment strength of our Naval Service, its current strength and the numbers required under level of ambition 2 of the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces?

We have a major logistics investment in a plane with strategic lift capability. I think we should have it by next year. It is a C295 but it is a variation of it which will enable us to carry out strategic lifts of citizens out of crisis areas. We have two C295s already. There is a third major investment coming and it should be ready and available to us next year.

Absolutely not. It is about learning about this area. We have to work with others, as we do already. What happens at the moment is that if certain ships go into the exclusive economic zones, services will alert other services. That happens regularly. When CHENS, the heads of all the navies across Europe, met in Cork about two years ago - it was a kind of social event - I had some very interesting chats with members of other navies and experts in this. Mathematical capability is very important, as are algorithms. This is a very complex area; it is not simple. For example, private operators have to co-operate with states. Who owns the cables? The governments do not own the cables. Who owns the data? I refer to maritime law. There are huge, complex issues in respect of this entire area. Even if we had full capacity, we would still be participating in these exercises, operations and learning experiences because this will be about who can outwit the other side. In other words, those who wish to interrupt or damage cables will be using all modern technologies to do that. It will not be just a crude cut-it-with-a-pliers job; it is more sophisticated than that. The defence of these cables will have to be equally robust and resilient, with knowledge, technology and experience. You will never have enough ships to be around every corner to spot a particular operation under way. Ships are very important from deterrent and awareness points of view, but it will take an awful lot more than that to be fully resilient in respect of our subsea cables. The private sector companies that own or use the cables will have to co-operate more too and open up more with governments and militaries to let them know exactly what is what. It was explained to me at the CHENS meeting what happens after 12 nautical miles. It is fascinating. If you are in international waters, who owns the data, for example?

This is a multidisciplinary situation that demands a multidisciplinary response.

When I was in the then Department of Education and Science, we incentivised collaboration between universities. There was a time when universities were go-it-alone merchants on things like nanotechnology, maths and computer science. We eventually incentivised them to work together to bring together the best brains. We are doing that through the shared island unit. We are bringing together the best brains on the island to deal with cancer diagnoses. We are not saying that any one university alone has the whole reservoir of knowledge. The same applies here. We would be very foolish not to avail of strong reservoirs of knowledge in other member states of the European Union and draw on that to enhance our own capabilities and protect our own infrastructure.

It was reported in the media last month that France, Britain and Norway had deployed military aircraft off the west coast of Ireland in search of a Russian submarine. Is the Tánaiste aware of that and, if so, does he want to make a statement on it? What engagements did the Department have with those-----

If I may, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, allows for all vessels, including military vessels, to transit through the territorial waters of coastal states when conducting innocent passage, as defined by Article 19 of UNCLOS. Therefore, any vessels transiting Irish waters must do so in compliance with international law. They may be subject to sighting and observation by the Defence Forces without their innocent passage being infringed. Then the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces will continue to engage with the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications on the protection of Ireland's offshore energy infrastructure and data cables. What tends to happen then, if a particular ship of interest is passing through, is that member states will talk to one another and it will be tracked by a number of interested parties. Sometimes when the crew becomes aware that the ship is being tracked, it exits or carries on to a different destination. You will read about this every now and again in the newspapers, but it is an ongoing phenomenon of observation, counter-observation and movement. Sometimes it may be with a view to ascertaining, in the case of the particular ship or submarine coming in, how much the crew can get away with it without being detected or observed.

Our Naval Service fisheries monitoring centre in Haulbowline continues to remotely monitor vessels in the Irish exclusive economic zone 24-7. That capacity exists. Then we have particular focus between air and naval platforms in respect of offshore assets and energy infrastructure.

The specific location I do not have right now. It could be in Brussels or in any other member state or, maybe, the lead state. On that, we have 17 full-time operational military installations, including army barracks, a naval base, an aerodrome and training camps. The Defence Forces are one of the largest energy users in the public service. That illustrates the value of this. The course will be split into three modules, with ten days in total, alternating with two periods of mentoring and on-the-job training. It will last 11 months in total. Four to six Defence Forces personnel will take places on the course per year, so we will have a different four to six the following year and we will eventually build up a pool of personnel. This is quite interesting and to be commended because the whole buildings part of retrofitting and energy efficiency is something Ireland as a whole must do, and I am glad that the Defence Forces are taking it seriously.

The Minister referred to carbon dioxide emissions and cost reductions across the military estate. What impact does he expect? He talked about damage in Lebanon from white phosphorus. The damage that war armaments cause to climate is significant when considering carbon emissions and so on, when you see the damage to the planet from war. What kind of impact does the Minister expect on carbon dioxide emissions and cost reduction across the military estate from this trained managers course? What is he hoping for? This is the most expensive course, at €1,500. The Minister was talking about cost implications earlier.

Some €1,500 is not a whole lot in the overall scheme of things. The application of this will be to the 17 full-time operation military installations that we have in Ireland which, as I said earlier, are the naval base, Baldonnel, the barracks, training camps and so on. We want to learn new ways of developing sustainable energy in respect of all these installations. Incremental work has been ongoing. A strategy was launched in 2011. ISO certification was achieved. Solar photovoltaic capacity was developed and electric vehicles were procured. We could do much more. I have been to almost all the barracks, if not all of them, at this stage. There is much building work going on, so we should build energy efficiency into those new buildings all the way. Solar panels are one option in particular. There is much potential here for reducing energy costs but I do not have a specific figure right now. Suffice it to say that other experiences and lessons will come to the fore during these exercises that we can apply to our own installations.

The final project the Minister is seeking Dáil approval on is for cyberdefence exercises. Will he talk about cyberdefence? We live in a complicated and compromised geopolitical reality. I say "compromised" because prior to the European elections, certain candidates said that they would not vote in favour of Ursula von der Leyen. The Government has already said that it will support her continued Presidency of the EU. She was so quick to support Israel in its attack on the citizens of Gaza. We are compromised now. I believe that certain MEPs who said they would not support her prior to the election are being leaned on now. We are always talking about Russia and the threat from it. Is the Government worried about threats from Israel? We know it used forged passports before to gain entry to, I think, Lebanon, to kill somebody. Is the Government threatened by that? Given the fact that Ireland has spoken out about Israel, is it only Russia that the Minister is worried about or is it worried about cyberdefence with regard to Israel too?

Regarding cybersecurity, there can be a number of actors, if you read any formal works on this or research undertaken by companies in the digital space. I was at the Munich security conference two years ago and last year. There was a presentation from Google which was quite informative about the criminal groups and state actors involved. Russia is a key state actor and our immediate threat is Russia, not just in Europe but Ireland as well.

A criminal gang in Russia, the Conti group, was alleged to have been involved in the HSE attack. Our gardaí did fantastic work in following up that investigation and shared their knowledge with the US and other states. This speaks to the global collaboration and co-operation that is absolutely essential to dealing with this. In any assessment of the Ukraine war, Russia is fighting that war on a number of fronts. The level of cyberactivity and cyberattacks has grown exponentially since the beginning of the war against many EU member states. That is the reality and the pattern. It is a dangerous form of warfare because it hits civilians, cripples utilities, and can create enormous damage to people's everyday lives. It would be irresponsible of this country not to participate in projects of this kind. That is the basis on which I am recommending this specific project. It does not have a read across to the situation in the Middle East and the appalling attack on Gaza. We need to be clear about that.

I think Deputy Cronin has covered most of what I wanted to ask. It reminds me of some old soldiers I met a long time ago who had gone out to Congo and to Jadotville, of all places, in the 1960s. They were extraordinarily badly equipped. The uniforms were made of bull's wool and were up to the neck. They had heavy boots, old Lee-Enfield rifles and Bren guns, and armoured cars you could shoot through. Generally speaking, they were very badly equipped. Since then and with our involvement with the United Nations, what I have learned from my dealings with the military here is that it has learned so much, because every time it goes to Lebanon and interacts with other militaries abroad, it learns. Our troops nowadays are highly trained, generally very well equipped, know what they are doing and are very professional. It is a big change from the 1960s when we were isolated and had no interaction with anyone else. Our troops were laughed at when they went to Congo that time, because they were so badly equipped. They had Second World War stuff which was totally obsolete.

I would be in favour of any form of co-operation. As was said, we can learn from others. We can learn what is best practice. From reading this and listening to the Tánaiste, that is what is going on. We are picking up best practice and learning how to use equipment, including what the best equipment to use is. Even if we were fully staffed, we would still be a minnow in the overall scheme of things. It is important that we co-operate and learn.

I have one question for the Tánaiste on critical seabed infrastructure protection. He says that, for the first time, the latest national risk assessment for Ireland identifies damage to undersea infrastructure as a key national level risk. He also asked a question about what goes on outside the 12-mile limit, which is also important. Will the Minister expand on what he means by it being a key national level risk, please?

The Deputy has eloquently articulated the situation about the evolution of standards for equipment, clothing, weaponry, trucks and so on since our first days in Congo. I visited the veterans' museum in Arbour Hill recently. It is worth a visit. It is a nice museum. They showed me the different uniforms from the beginning. Even in Lebanon in the 1970s, in a very hot environment, somebody was not thinking about, as the Deputy says, woollen-----

It was very thick stuff. Things progress and evolve. That is the nature of these exercises too. Remember, as I said earlier in the earlier statement on the UN, that we are working in Lebanon with Poland and Hungary in POLBATT. There are may be some Maltese too. Interoperability is key.

That is why training and engaging with others through PESCO, the EDA and battle groups, for that matter, are important. Many of the outcomes of the battle group experiences we have had in the past ten or 15 years have meant better equipment and kit and so on, including bulletproof vests, helmets and all of that. We learn from this. It is critical we support these measures.

On the critical seabed infrastructure, the national risk assessment is under the emergency planning structure. It recently completed its national risk register, which included for the first time our seabed infrastructure. Academics from DCU led that risk assessment for the country and we published it recently. It reflects the changing geopolitical environment. The situation in respect of Nord Stream and what happened recently in the Balkans are signs that something which perhaps would not have been contemplated in the past is now very much on the agenda.

I thank the Tánaiste. If we are here in the autumn, we might invite some of those experts to talk to the committee about the risks. I would be interested to know what the contingencies are if some of these cables are damaged, blown up, tapped into or whatever else happens. I would be interested to hear what the impact on our economy and everything else might be.

I mentioned Jadotville and I know there is an issue with medals in that respect. It would be remiss of me not to bring up that matter.

Numbers have increased from a very low base. There has been an effective build-up. I recall meeting with representatives of the centre at the time of the HSE attack when it was at a relatively embryonic stage of its formation. There has been a dramatic scaling up of that centre. It is an important centre and it is well led, if I may say so. The key for us is that, just as we want to co-operate on a European and global level, we need an integrated and multiagency response in Ireland to cyber issues. The National Cyber Security Centre takes the lead but there is also input from the Defence Forces, the Garda and other Departments. That is key. We must build a community of cybersecurity intelligence in the country. The private sector in Ireland is strong in the field, which is important. The overall human capital in the country is such that if an emergency or something terrible happens, we have a critical mass of people, led by the agency, to drive our response. We will get the relevant figures for the Deputy.

It is.

Many other states are growing fast in that respect because they have to. Cyber and maritime are the new fields of threat.