I echo Dr. Manning's words by thanking the joint committee for the invitation to appear before it and address members on the Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence and DNA Database System) Bill 2010. Legislative reforms that regulate the taking of bodily samples and the creation of DNA profiles for the investigation of criminal offences engage important questions of human rights. Given the extreme privacy of one's DNA, any collecting of data from it would be required to respect the right to private life. The organs of the State — the Department and the Forensic Science Laboratory — are required by statute to conduct their business in accordance with the convention and, by implication, its jurisprudence. The convention is very concerned about proportionality where invasions of privacy are concerned.
In respect of a recent case which the Minister referred to in his contribution, S & Marper v. the United Kingdom, the European Court had harsh things to say about the regime in place in our neighbouring jurisdiction. It is of interest to note what can happen where insufficiently constructed and controlled schemes for the gathering of DNA samples or profiles are allowed either to develop by function creep or to be put in place by legislation. The UK scheme has come under severe criticism from the European Court of Human Rights for the excessive length of time that samples may be retained on the database. That is an issue to which I will return later.
The second issue is interesting and should be of concern to us all. It appears from the UK — research has been done on this which we can supply to the committee — that if too wide a discretion is given to the sample gathering agency, which virtually always will be the police force, the database is distorted in that people whom the police traditionally consider bad end up disproportionately on the database. In the UK, there is a hugely disproportionate number of young black males on the database because they are the people who get arrested and are swabbed. Clearly that is undesirable in a democratic state that lives by the rule of law. That is one of the dangers that must always be borne in mind when one is dealing with these kinds of potentially intrusive powers being conferred on agencies of the state.
I do not want to give the impression that the commission is opposed to a DNA Bill. DNA and the associated science is a very powerful investigative tool for the prosecution agencies, but it is essential that its use and the circumstances in which the samples are gathered are carefully thought out and properly controlled. This is the area where the commission has some concerns about the Bill as structured. There appears to be some contradiction in thinking as to whether it is to be a purely investigative DNA database, an intelligence database or both. Quite different problems and criteria arise between setting up an investigative database and an intelligence database. This is an aspect that could be usefully explored when the Bill is further considered by the Oireachtas.
Another problem which can arise and about which the commission is concerned is that the Bill proposes to allow samples to be taken from convicted persons, forcibly if necessary. With some limited exceptions such as sex offenders or, where there is a subsequent conviction, the sentencing judge is given evidence of the previous conviction, the general position and rule in regard to convicted persons who serve sentences is that once they have served their sentence, they have paid their debt to society and should not be answerable again for the offence for which they have served their time and paid their debt. The view of the commission is that if this type of power is to be invoked, if a sex crime occurs and the Garda investigates it, people should not be hauled in willy-nilly and re-sampled. Where that type of sampling is to be done, there should be judicial oversight. The Garda should be required to apply to a District Court judge for an order to bring a person in where he or she is not a suspect but merely because he or she has a previous conviction and has served his or her sentence.
When I was a young lawyer the Vagrancy Act allowed gardaí to arrest people, who had a previous conviction for standing around on the street, and have them jailed. In a famous case, King v. the Attorney General, the Supreme Court ruled that was an outrage and could not possibly survive in any democratic state that lived by the rule of law.
The commission envisages the remote possibility of a similar position arising here in that this type of power could be used a little like Inspector Renault in "Casablanca" used his power to "round up the usual suspects". That is the reason we are recommending that there should be a judicial oversight in the exercise of such power where someone is to be brought in and sampled purely on the basis that he or she has had a previous conviction.
We have some concerns about volunteers. One aspect with which we would be concerned is that if somebody is asked, as a volunteer, to provide a DNA sample in circumstances where, say, the gardaí are conducting an investigation into a crime committed in a certain area and the person refuses, which as a volunteer he or she is perfectly entitled to do, the refusal should not thereby convert them into a suspect who may be arrested and a sample taken from him or her forcibly. We consider that of considerable importance because as matters stand, the power to seek voluntary samples from members of the public is capable of being converted into a coercive power. That is something that would be wholly undesirable, certainly from a human rights point of view.
We are also concerned about the length of time samples are to be held, particularly samples where either the suspect from whom the sample has been obtained has been acquitted or the case has been discontinued due to insufficient evidence. It is the commission's view that in those circumstances the default destruction period, which will be a matter for the Dáil to decide, should be considerably shorter than is currently the case.
I am aware there is a power in the Bill to allow persons to apply in writing to have their bodily samples and DNA profiles destroyed or removed, which is all very well in theory. I wonder how many people would do so in practice because it involves, first, applying to the commissioner and then appealing the request to the District Court if he refuses the applicant. Research in the United Kingdom appears to show that if someone ends up on the DNA database, irrespective of how he or she got on to it, it changes his or her status slightly as a citizen. The person's most intimate personal details are available to any policeman who logs on to his computer. It is the commission's view that the Bill should be careful to only allow samples to be put on the database where it is necessary for the investigation of crime and where it is proportionate.
There are also some concerns about the taking of samples in terms of a power being given for the first time, of which I am aware, in Irish law. The Bill permits the use of reasonable force to take a sample where there is a refusal. That is something entirely new to all of us and something that would want to be carefully thought through. The commission has set out recommendations as to the factors that should be taken into consideration before the use of force is permitted and that the taking of any sample using the use of force should be video recorded, not optionally but compulsorily, and if it is not video recorded, it should be inadmissible. At least then the trial court, which would have to consider whether procedures have been complied with, would have proper hard evidence as to how this new and, in my view, draconian procedure is being put into effect.
The commission also has concerns, particularly in respect of young people, with regard to where the Bill provides that where consent is refused, negative inferences can be drawn from it. In other words, that when a case comes to trial, the jury trying it can be invited to draw inferences, which are adverse to the person on trial, from his or her refusal to provide a sample, but it provides, as all these negative inferences Bills do, that the negative inference on its own cannot convict a person, it can only be corroborative. However, it is still capable of being very powerful corroborative evidence. From the commission's point of view it is important that persons who find themselves in this situation should be properly advised and should make an informed decision as to whether they will consent to the giving of a sample or refuse to do so and face the consequences. The commission would have particular concerns in that the provision in the Bill for access to legal advice is the formula that is used in many such Bills, namely, that reasonable access to a solicitor shall be given. A decision of the former Mr. Justice Keane when Chief Justice in the Buck case — which I am ashamed to say I did not check — effectively ruled that reasonable access to a solicitor means that the gardaí shall make reasonable efforts to get the person one and if they cannot get him or her a solicitor, then that is tough. If a person were to refuse to give a sample, he or she would be subject to these negative inference provisions without getting legal advice, and this can apply to relatively young people. The commission would be very concerned about that and it would be our recommendation that if these types of provisions are to be invoked, they can only be invoked not where this reasonable access formula has been applied but where the person against whom the negative inference provision is to be invoked has had a consultation with a lawyer.
We would be particularly concerned that these negative inference provisions apply to people as young as 14 years of age. What is a 14 year old going to make of some fellow in a blue uniform telling him or her that he or she has to give a sample and if he or she does not, refusal to do so can be invoked as negative inference at his or her trial but that this would only be corroborative evidence. What would a young fellow in his final year in primary school make of that? The commission considers it essential that in those kinds of circumstances the person would not only have reasonable access to a solicitor but that he or she would have seen a solicitor before any of these powers can arise.
We also have some concerns with regard to children or young persons who would be subject to the provisions of the Bill and no parent or relative can be located to come to the Garda station as, unfortunately, happens not infrequently. The Bill provides that a person not a member of the Garda Síochána shall be present while the procedure is being gone through. It would be the commission's recommendation that the person who is to stand-in for the parent or guardian of the child should be somebody who is a qualified social worker, someone experienced in dealing with young people, who would be able to get the young person the necessary help and support to deal with the matter.
I believe I have covered all the various matters the commission wished to address before the committee. We will deal with any questions members have as best we can.