JOINT COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT debate -
Wednesday, 21 Apr 2010

The next item on the agenda is a brief discussion with representatives from the Irish Aviation Authority, IAA, on the disruption caused to flights as a result of ash from the eruption of a volcano in Iceland. I understand officials from the Department of Transport are also present.

I draw attention to the fact that members of this committee have absolute privilege but that this same privilege does not apply to witnesses appearing before it. Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the Houses or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. Members are also reminded that civil servants, while giving evidence to the committee, may not question or express an opinion on the merits of any Government policy or policy objectives or produce or send to a committee any documents in which a civil servant, a member of the Defence Forces or a member of the Garda Síochána questions or expresses an opinion on the merits of any Government policy or policy objectives.

I ask Mr. Eamonn Brennan, chief executive of the IAA, to make a brief presentation to the committee.

I will be brief. We have circulated a short presentation, the main contents of which are pictures and maps. It is quite an interesting document. It begins with the eruption of what I will term the Icelandic volcano. If the Acting Chairman can actually pronounce the name of the latter, I congratulate him. The second page of the document contains photographic evidence of the extent of the plume which emerged when the volcano in question erupted. The main eruption happened last Wednesday and the result was drift down over Irish and European airspace on Thursday. I will describe this shortly. The red arrow on page 3 gives an indication of the ash cloud over Iceland and I will show the committee the way it drifts. The white stuff is snow from some of the mountains but one can see the ash starting to drift up the way there into the top atmosphere.

The next page is a quick satellite image of the volcano and I will deal with how we responded to it shortly. We can see the lava fountain, the steam and so on to give some perspective. This is an unstable volcano and the problem we were faced with in the past week is that it could erupt on day 1, be quiet on day 2 and then erupt again on day 3. Each time it is under control, it could go out of control again from a geological point of view.

The next page has a 30 on the bottom right of it. We can see the airspace. Iceland is up in the north and there is Reykjavik FIR, and Shanwick, which is Shannon. We are in the zone with 90% of all the traffic. It is important to realise that is a dense traffic zone and that would be different from other parts of the world where volcanos are located, which I will come to later.

The next one shows volcanic ash magnified 100 times under a microscope. It is a crystalline, glassy, sandy, ashy type deposit and it is similar to glass and silica. The principal concern the aviation authorities throughout Europe had is the effect of volcanic ingestion on jet and turbo fan engines. Because of the high temperature in the engine, the ingestion of the ash melts and forms a glass coating which can stop, damage and impede the performance of the engine and so on. It presents a serious hazard, mainly to the fuel system and to the engine cooling system, and it can severely affect aircraft operations. That is the major worry. I quote four examples of many on the next page. There was a total engine failure of a 747-200 in Indonesia, a 747 cargo in Alaska, a 727 as a result of the Mount St. Helens eruption and a DC-8.

The next page shows the operational problem we had. Iceland's volcano rises to 5,465 feet and the normal cruising altitude aircraft use is between 35,000 feet to 40,000 feet. The ash cloud went to 35,000 feet. At its peak, the volcano was emitting 750 metric tonnes per second into the atmosphere and the plume at its peak was 6 km high. It is now down to 2 km. The difficulty for jets and turbo fans is they must come down through the ash cloud to land in an airport and that caused the problem.

The next page is a sample shot from 20 April at 3 a.m. showing ash dispersion. It is not a density chart but most of the aircraft tracked south towards Spain to get to Europe that night and all the normal tracks running through Ireland and the UK had to be closed completely. It was an interesting night. It was the first time in 60 years that the US-Ireland-mainland Europe track was fully closed without access due to the ash.

The next page refers to wind direction. On 20 April, the direction was northerly, which means it was blowing the ash on top of Ireland and the UK. The problem is we had unique meteorological phenomena over recent days. The projected wind direction over the next few days, I am glad to say, is much more optimistic in that it will be south westerly and that should enable us to proceed on a much better basis over the next few days.

The next page is described as "Impact". Since last Thursday, 2,139 flights have been cancelled at Dublin Airport and regional airports affecting approximately 300,000 passengers. Airline losses in Europe are estimated to be €200 million a day. We have tried to get an estimate of what it is costing Irish airlines. We met some of their representatives earlier. Ryanair says it is losing approximately €6 million a day; Aer Lingus, €5 million a day; and CityJet, €1 million a day. This is a significant cost to the airlines because many of their costs such as crews and so on are fixed. Their variable costs are low.

The next page refers to the impact on European flights, which is dramatic. During the peak days, 78% of flights were cancelled on Saturday, 17 April and 67% on Monday, 19 April. If one was inside the ash zone, one was not flying. The number of flights is significantly down on a year ago in any event. Traffic in Europe is down approximately 10% because of the recession. It was a major catastrophe for airlines and passengers last week when there was a 52% dip.

The next page outlines what we did. It is important to recognise the unprecedented scope of this crisis that hit us and to realise that we had learned valuable lessons from other volcanic eruptions in other parts of the world, including from the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA, in regard to the Mount St. Helens incident, New Zealand and Indonesia. However, we were faced with a problem on a different scale because this ash cloud went right over the continent in an area of dense traffic. New Zealand, Alaska and so on do not have the same density of traffic as Europe. It was unprecedented from that point of view.

We acted pretty sharpish. First we closed all the airspace. Everybody in Europe did that. The reason is we are not in the business of taking risks and the most important thing was safety. There was no overreaction. This is the standard procedure where there is a risk and it was the right thing to do in the circumstances. Then, on a Europe-wide basis, we went about collecting data about the density of the ash cloud. The big unknown was not the amount of ash but its density at each level. We had four to five days of test flights by KLM and Lufthansa and British Airways did a test flight for us over Irish airspace on Saturday. A Dornier from the UK CAA also did test flights. We assembled scientific analysis of data and empirical data. We were trying to build a risk model. Ireland and the UK decided to take a joint approach. There is no point in Ireland going X and the UK going Y because our main routes are in and out of the UK. We did this in a European context.

We agreed a longer-term solution, which is on the next page. By Monday, we were in a position to bring a proposal through Eurocontrol to a transport ministers Council meeting on Monday afternoon. We came up with a longer-term, more sustainable future based on the scientific and empirical research done over the previous five days. We agreed a no-fly zone around the plume on a Europe-wide basis with a safety buffer. This is reviewed every six hours. We have also agreed with the engine manufacturers more inspections and monitoring of engines and centralised reporting and updating of information.

The next page illustrates the no-fly zones, as of noon on 20 April, to the north and south of Ireland. It means aircraft cannot be operated under any circumstances in those zones. The red mark indicates the buffer zone. As far as operations are concerned, if either of those zones are over Ireland, we are not in a position to operate aircraft.

On the next page it can be seen that by 6 a.m. today, 21 April, the cloud had moved off to a single area of concentration, just north-west of Ireland. That is the no-fly zone. It is an important consideration and we should be aware that there is ash in the atmosphere generally, but we have agreed procedures whereby we can operate with the engine manufacturers' consent. With the airlines' safety and empirical data, we can operate with reduced levels of ash. We have been able to measure this.

I will move on now to the next page where the point I want to illustrate is that the no-fly zone keeps moving north. The pages are not numbered because we had to put this presentation together quickly. On the next page, the red line indicates what the system would look like tomorrow morning if we had done nothing. If we had not worked and co-operated with the European Union and the United Kingdom, Ireland would be the one area that would probably be closed tomorrow while the UK and everywhere else would be operating. However, because we have developed a scientific risk model, we have had a very positive response from the Commission and the other authorities and are able to operate.

I will look at the conclusions now. The current situation is unprecedented. Safety is our number one priority. I have heard a number of people say the aircraft should operate and be flown visually. By and large, this is rubbish. We do not agree with that here and neither Ireland nor the UK would operate that way. We are quite a strong regulator. It is quite simple. If there is a safety risk, it is important we do not operate. That is the basis on which we operate. We have had no commercial pressure from any airline of any type or sort asking us to open. I compliment the Irish airlines not alone on not putting us under pressure but also because all of them agreed with our assessment and risk model and supported us through this. We now have an agreed ongoing approach.

I remind the committee that this is not over. If the volcano erupts again and if we are in the designated no-fly zone, the airspace and the airports will have to be closed again. However, we now have a European-wide approach to dealing with the situation. This means that if the cloud affects Ireland, this does not mean the whole Continent will be shut, as it would have been up to last week. From now on, only a buffer zone and the core area will be shut and extra precautions will be taken. To give an example, as the ash cloud drifts further, the risk area changes. I spoke to my colleague in Scandinavia today and it is now experiencing airport and air space closures because the main risk area is there. Therefore, we have come to a better solution and better way of managing the situation. This has been done with the strong co-operation of the UK Civil Aviation Authority and the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States. What we have put together is a strong, robust model that will ensure the safety of the travelling public.

I included the final slide because I thought it was a good one. It might please the Acting Chairman. Last night we were in a position to open Shannon to flights. A British Airways aircraft had left the United States and then British air space closed, so we took quite a number of British Airways aircraft in Shannon.

I hope I have provided a reasonable explanation of the situation. We have acted at all times solely in the interest of safety. We have tried to make progress as quickly as possible but we could not decide to change anything until we had the empirical evidence based on the test flights. That was the main reason we had difficulty making quick progress. We had to gather a volume of data. Otherwise the engine manufacturers would not approve the revised procedures. This took some time. The procedures are now in place and it is to be hoped we will not have a recurrence of the situation.

I have provided a document but I will go over the key points. The task force, which was chaired by the Department of Transport, met on the day the eruption took place and had an impact on aviation and continues to meet daily in the national emergency co-ordinating centre. I have set out in the documentation all the various Departments and bodies which have been part of that process. It is central to the role of the task force to ensure the public bodies are providing a co-ordinated response and that the public is aware of it. Part of our concern is to know what the Department and agencies are doing and to fit that into the picture to ensure we get the optimum benefit. We must ask them the questions that ensure they are doing everything that is necessary and ensure the key elements of information are presented to both the public and decision makers where required.

The next stage is to set out the various restrictions and the current position. I will not go through that in detail as Mr. Brennan has already covered that. Page 3 of my document covers the work of the task force. There were a number of priority issues from our perspective. At the early stage we believed a number of these should be examined, discussed and clarified. The experts from all the agencies were central to this discussion, both with regard to providing information and explanations. One of the first issues was that as the IAA was making decisions, we needed to understand what was happening and see it in the wider context of tourism, the travelling public and so on and to be able to make some sensible statements to the public on that. We were assured at all times that the agencies making decisions had information within their websites, but we wanted to be able to frame that information so that the public would have an understanding of the situation and the media would be able to take from it a sense of what was happening.

We also needed to be able to ensure the latest geological and meteorological information affecting the path of the ash cloud would be brought to the table. In that regard, Met Éireann and the Geological Survey of Ireland were central to the advisers. One of the public concerns at the beginning was whether there were health concerns with regard to the ash cloud. Therefore, in parallel with the work about understanding what was happening, the Health Service Executive, HSE, and the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, using information coming from the relevant international bodies such as, for example, the European Centre for Disease Control, etc., brought forward specific data on the content of the ash. They were also aware that during the week the ash might settle or be brought down by rain. The public needed to know that this was being monitored throughout the period. We were getting monitoring reports every day so that we could constantly send out the message that there was no change in the advice and that there was no health risk or threat to the environment. We were also able to inform the public that if the ash did come down, it would have dispersed so much by then that it would not pose a danger. That remains the position.

An issue that arose as the week wore on was the provision of information to the public on their rights and entitlements. Our concern was that the Commission for Aviation Regulation, in particular, should publicise information on the EU rules relating to passenger rights. We also wanted to ensure clarity on the primacy of the relationship between the passenger and the airline. The public needed to be informed what changing tickets would mean within the EU rules. We learned early on that if people decided to make their own way back, they would lose some entitlements. It was important people were made aware of that before they made decisions.

Another issue was the capacity of the ferries. It was difficult to know the capacity required because people were spread all over the Continent. It was critical that we could be assured we had a ferry and capacity available between here and France and here and the UK and that these could cater for a substantial increase in passengers.

We stayed in touch with the companies. As the week went on and as we continued to focus on new elements, we worked to ensure that visitors here were being well supported. Fáilte Ireland and the tourism industry seem to have done a very substantial job and they are to be complimented. They ensured there was help available to people even for small things such as arranging for laundry to be done free of charge — which is important — as well as being able to acquire accommodation at reasonable prices. We were informed this is what was happening.

We also looked at the impact on the industry which relies on aviation freight transport. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, undertook this work. It is clear that many companies were able to find alternative means of transport for movement of freight. Information on passenger rights has been a continuing issue. As the airlines became free to operate again, we were concerned about how they would address the return of passengers. In that regard, the Department of Transport met the operators this morning to discuss their plans. The operators must design effective plans, having regard to the positioning of their fleets and depending on where people are. The objective is to get people back as quickly as possible.

The Department of Foreign Affairs opened a crisis response service and dealt with quite a number of calls, in addition to the information being provided by embassies. The Department and the embassies were very effective in providing information to the public as to how they could make their way back to Ireland. People needed to find out how to access alternative methods of transport. A small number of cases which go beyond inconvenience, such as people with mobility difficulties, were dealt with by the Department which continues to be a valuable resource for the task force. It continues to provide us with information about the type of queries being raised by the public so we could infer what were the concerns and try to respond to them.

Throughout the process it was very difficult to estimate the exact numbers of people, simply because this is an open market and there is free movement of goods and people. Some countries had information of X numbers of people from Y country but there was not an exact basis for these statistics because there is so much movement and people buy one-way tickets. We attempted to triangulate some information. The Commission had estimated the numbers of people. We used that estimate and multiplied it by a factor of four or five, because as Irish people live on an island, they travel a lot more. We came to a figure of somewhere around 30,000 to 40,000 caught at any particular time. Many people had left the country and were moving in all directions. We had some sense of what we were trying to deal with. In any case, the aim was to keep people moving back to Ireland by means of the various options still available.

We continue to be facilitated by the Departments and agencies which have undertaken research and work for the task force with regard to enterprise or tourism or shipping information. The task force issued a press statement each day to highlight key issues of public concern. The earlier press statements concentrated on the health issues because this was a concern while today's statement has more information about passenger rights because this has become a concern to people. We are working with the various Departments and agencies to ensure everyone is operating up to speed.

I welcome the delegations from the Irish Aviation Authority and the Department of Transport and thank them for attending as they are very busy at this difficult time. I congratulate the delegates for their work and commitment. I agree with Mr. Brennan that it is a question of safety. I accept the adequacy and correctness of the approach taken. Safety must be the first priority because one must not take a chance with any life or any plane.

The problems raised by people are more properly issues for the Department of Transport than for the delegations. One issue raised was to do with rip-off merchants operating outside the country. I have heard about eight people flying from Tenerife to Spain having to pay an extortionate €1,200 per head for a one-way ticket. This was not with an Irish carrier but it is a serious matter. However, our current consumer legislation will not cover them because they found their own way back — it was the only way they could travel because they had to get back to work. I presume the only way to deal with that problem is in a European context.

The other issue which came to my attention was the question of embassy cover. Notwithstanding the excellent work and I do not wish to make a personal criticism of any official, a number of travellers in Madrid were unable to contact the Irish Embassy over the weekend. They telephoned me and I was able to contact the Department of Foreign Affairs on Sunday. There needs to be 24-seven cover or as near as possible when these emergencies occur. This cover is needed on a Friday rather than on the following Monday. This may be difficult but there should be a plan in place.

The Irish Aviation Authority will need to plan for the future. If this adjoining volcano — which is massive — should decide to do its business in the next decade or two or even in the next week or two, how will we deal with such an event? How can such an event be provided for? There could be greater problems when this happens. We are all happy that the emergency is over now but I have lingering doubts. Mr. Brennan will probably reassure me but I have lingering doubts as to whether it is all over. I am not confident it is.

I welcome the IAA and the Department of Transport and thank them for all the valuable work they have done for the country over the past days. I agree with Mr. Brennan that this is an unprecedented situation. I refer to the New Scientist magazine which stated that we should pay attention to volcanoes because there is a possibility there could be a similar event in some part of the world every decade or so and perhaps a mega-event at some stage in the next few hundred years.

The Irish Aviation Authority has devised a protocol involving three zones. However, some criticism was expressed in the European Parliament that Eurocontrol seemed to be slow in devising this plan, given that NASA has very detailed information on volcanic activity. Mr. Brennan referred to New Zealand and that other control areas are not very busy. None the less, parts of the Indonesian archipelago are close to India and China. I wonder if we should have had more information available and I question why it took so long to work out the protocol. The Australian newspapers and Australian pilots talk about these six layers which are encountered at different stages of volcanic eruption. On the scientific front, were we a bit slow getting off the mark and working together across Europe?

I have some questions for Mr. Mullen. I heard the head of the British Airline Pilots' Association say on the BBC's "Newsnight" in recent days that it is the captain's job to say whether the plane should fly. It is the captain's decision from start to finish. That is his or her sacred role. He compared it to the hippocratic oath. That being the case, why was there no pilot or aviation engineer on the emergency taskforce? Mr. Mullen outlined the members of his taskforce and I accept it included a representative of the IAA. Would it not have been better to have an aviation engineer or pilot to give cutting-edge experience in that regard?

What will happen regarding travel insurance? Mr. Mullen mentioned the CAR which has a big responsibility here. Was this an act of God? How are people covered? What are the consequences? A spokesperson for Ryanair today said that it did not want any help from Europe but it would not cover people who were stranded abroad.

There was criticism of Aer Lingus throughout the crisis. I heard on some media shows that Aer Lingus went missing and its representatives disappeared from the airport desks with the Aer Lingus logo. Are there questions to be asked to the two main Irish airlines over their reaction to this? Have they played fair by our travellers? Were they prepared to protect people whom they might have brought on return tickets to particular destinations when this emerged? What is the exact position? I accept Mr. Mullen has said they can complain to the CAR, but what is the Department of Transport doing about the situation in which they have been left?

People going on holiday are often recommended to bring twice the money and half the clothes. Many people were in trouble financially. What did the emergency taskforce do to help them given that many of them reached their credit card limits and so on? Ulster Bank seems to have done a good job in this regard. I heard of no efforts by the Department of Finance or the emergency taskforce in conjunction with the Department of Finance to help people. I agree with my colleague that people were being ripped off. What happened in that area in order to protect people?

This morning I put to the Taoiseach what the European Commissioner for Transport, Commissioner Kallas, said. He has said that European law provides that people have the right to receive information from airlines, the right to care — refreshments, meals, accommodation as appropriate — and the right to chose between reimbursement of fares or be re-routed to final destination. The transport area is effectively run by Europe. What will the Department of Transport do to ensure those rights are effective? Regardless of how distinguished he is, the head of a particular airline cannot say to his customers, "Sorry folks. That's it. Let's get on with it".

Commissioner Kallas and President Barroso also said they are now prepared to consider exceptional aid to airlines. They say that it was an unprecedented event similar to what happened on 11 September 2001. Hopefully we will not need to go through it again. That being the case is the Department drawing up any proposals if requested by any Irish airline to give any kind of exceptional aid, given that Aer Lingus has lost €5 million or €6 million each day over the past six days and Ryanair has lost €9 million to €10 million each day?

Our economy has been severely damaged. In the second half of this year we will want economic growth to pick up. This incident following the flooding, and the ice and cold over the winter, could wreck our growth trajectory and has done significant damage. Aviation is so important to the Acting Chairman's constituency and to my constituency, and to the entire economy. We need to be able to move goods in and out of the country to help our trade. The economy has been badly damaged in the past five or six days. We need to be cognisant of the seriousness of the situation.

I welcome both groups and congratulate them on their work. I agree that safety was their priority and that could never be compromised. I wish to ask about evolving Ireland-UK co-operation. What level of co-operation has commenced within Europe? Are other countries joining together to form passage free areas, as one might call them? Many people who were abroad in the Canaries or Africa took short flights to Spain and travelled by train or road to Calais to take the ferry to Dover and travelled on to Holyhead to take the ferry to Ireland. Are there other models of the Ireland-UK co-operation operating across Europe so that we can learn to get people evacuated, if I can use that expression, from foreign parts?

What co-ordination took place involving the ferries, and private and public transport? What can we do for the future? We heard people phoning the "Liveline" programme with representatives of different transport companies saying they had a truck passing through Paris and offering to pick a person up. We need some co-ordination — possibly a website — for freight companies, bus operators and ferries to tap into and state the services they offer on particular dates.

For people abroad the 24-hour call situation left something to be desired, particularly from the airlines. In future it should be mandatory for all airlines and ferry companies to have 24-hour coverage with people available to answer telephones outlining what they have available. The Internet is fine for those who are computer literate. Not everyone who is abroad can use computers or they may not have access. It is fine for those who carry their laptops with them. Deputy Broughan has already referred to the advice to carry twice the amount of money and less baggage. However, not everyone would be carrying laptops.

Regarding call centres in the event of an emergency either the Department of Transport or the Department of Foreign Affairs should set up something. The Icelandic Prime Minister has advised that another volcano is due to erupt again. If that happened or if the current volcano were to blow up, let us be ready.

What discussions has the Department of Transport had with freight companies and exporters? The main priority has been to get people back home. However, given the impact on the economy, has the Department had discussions with airlines and exporters on how they get their products out?

Regarding the rip-off scenario we will need to come up with some solutions at EU level. It is not fair that airlines, etc., should charge quadruple or ten times the normal price.

I thank the groups for their submissions. They have had a very difficult few days. I was one of those sitting on a plane in Frankfurt last Thursday morning. I might give my side of the story. The airline in question, Ryanair, gave us another flight. I went to Berlin. I could not access certain websites. I could not get through to Stena Line or Irish Ferries. When I got through to P&O, I found it ridiculous that the company was unable to take foot passengers. I was not able to contact Stena Line, Irish Ferries or Ryanair. The RTE website was very informative. Everyone was told that bookings could not be made. They should have been told to get to the ferries. We got to Brussels. We tried to get the Eurostar last Sunday, but we were told no trains were available until Thursday. Four of us got a taxi from Brussels to London. It cost us €200 each. I was then told that we might not get a ferry from Holyhead. I got a train at Euston Station at 8.30 p.m. The rail and ferry ticket from London cost €30. When I got on the train, there was nobody on it. I thought there would be pandemonium at Holyhead. The Irish Ferries boat that departed at 2.45 a.m. was operating at just one fifth of its capacity. That information was not made known. People are still waiting in London and all around the country because they do not know there are loads of ferries. I saw some nonsense on a website to the effect that the Taoiseach was calling on the Royal Navy to bring people home. Ryanair or the Irish Aviation Authority should have used the mobile phone numbers of passengers to let it be known that sufficient capacity was available on the ferries. People should have been advised to make their way to the ferries. We failed to address this aspect of the matter. I appreciate that it was a significant problem.

Irish Rail and Bus Éireann could have told the people that buses were going from London to Dublin. All it would have taken was someone with a bit of ingenuity. It would have been much easier for people if they knew they did not have to queue for ferries. I do not think Bus Éireann came out very well from this episode. Many people incurred substantial mobile phone costs over the past week. Deputy Broughan rightly said that tens of thousands of people will have financial difficulties as a result of this crisis. I did not pay the instalment that was due on my AIB Visa card last month. I explained my case on the telephone. In fairness, they made €300 available in case I wanted to buy a ticket. On this occasion, I have to give credit where credit is due. The airlines should have sent text messages to their passengers so that we did not have to look up the various websites. They have the mobile phone numbers and e-mail addresses of passengers. The airlines should have let us know that all flights from Berlin were cancelled. I took a train from Frankfurt to Berlin. I ended up on a tour of Germany. It was pleasant because I was on my own, thankfully.

Many people who were travelling with children were not given any information. I appreciate that the airlines had a job to do. However, I do not think enough was done to relay the information to the public. I am not blaming the delegates. Sometimes I blame the airlines. I am amazed by the report — I do not know if it came from the delegates — that the Taoiseach called on the Royal Navy to bring people home. It sounds like Dunkirk. Did that come from the delegates? At least 80% of the space on the ferry that departed at 2.45 a.m. on Sunday night was free. Nobody was standing. It was lovely and pleasant. I suggest that 5,000 or 10,000 people were in London because they were not told that spaces were available on the ferries and trains.

I want to deal with one point and my colleague, Mr. Humphreys, will deal with the other point. I am conscious of the committee's time. Deputy O'Dowd, who has left the meeting, said he feels this is not over. I want to reinforce the point made in the presentation that this is not over. That is an important thing to realise. Under the new model we have agreed, if the no-fly zone moves down over Ireland, we will not be operating — we will do the exact same thing again. During the presentation, I tried to deal with the suggestion that the response was slow, a point that was made again today by Deputy Broughan. Obviously, he is probing for a little more detail. I ask the authority's director of safety, Mr. Humphreys, to deal with that point.

I fully understand the perception that the movement was not very quick. One has to understand that the meteorological situation regarding the ash cloud could have changed. When this volcano erupted previously, it did not affect Ireland in the way it did on this occasion. The positioning of the anticyclone brought the cloud down over Ireland this week. When one looks at the map that was presented, Ireland's position at the centre of the ash cloud is particularly significant. We are in the line of fire. The plume continues to be positioned between Ireland and Iceland. We are in a more difficult position than any other country in Europe. Reference was made to the use of satellites by the United States and NASA. The US Federal Aviation Administration uses a system in which imaging is done by means of satellites. Essentially, it comes up with roughly the same model we have now. We have to wait. I agree that it was right to be cautious until we had some scientific data on the amount of ash that was in the atmosphere. The point I must emphasise, from an airworthiness point of view, is that no engine is certified to fly in volcanic ash of any description at any level. If an engine has flown through such ash, specific post-maintenance checks must be immediately carried out. There is a severe regime of post-maintenance in the Alaska region. That imposes a huge economic penalty, for example in terms of turn-around times and the amount of maintenance that is required at out-stations. It is not as simple as it appears.

I agree that this episode will have to be reviewed and many lessons will have to be learnt. This is the starting point. We have many questions to ask, for example about the manner in which a great deal of information was dispersed. It is not a question of individual representation on the task force — various agencies are represented on it. They used the expertise that was available to them.

The authority was represented on the task force from two perspectives — as the operator of air navigation and air traffic services and as the regulator of safety standards of civil aviation. That is central to the issue raised by Deputy Broughan. A number of points were made about various matters, such as insurance, which may be considered by the European Commission. It is clear that an extraordinary meeting of the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council will be held shortly. Many things will be on the table as the various responses are considered.

The Irish Maritime Development Office and ferry companies released information every day. In our statement we indicated that capacity was available. The information we provided to the Department of Foreign Affairs and other entities was that capacity was available. This obviated the need for people to take alternative long trips. Our objective was to give the information.

We have worked closely with others in recent days, including the Civil Aviation Authority in the United Kingdom. This co-operation was of considerable assistance to us. We have a large number of engineers and pilots working on the issue H24. We nominated the deputy chief executive to join the task force and he received technical advice from our air worthiness and specialist pilots every day. Proper advice was available to the task force. As Deputies will appreciate, however, the Irish Aviation Authority is a small organisation and we needed all hands on deck when this event occurred.

The Department thanks all the agencies and Departments involved in this issue. We also thank tourist interests and the ferry companies which carried 40,000 passengers in recent days. An extraordinary effort was made by a large number of people. Notwithstanding the mistakes made, a massive amount of the work on this issue was done correctly.

On behalf of the joint committee, I thank the Department and Irish Aviation Authority for the manner in which they dealt with the crisis. Mr. Mullen is correct that we are at the early stages of developing a long-term solution for a problem that may reoccur. I thank our guests for appearing before the joint committee at short notice for their detailed presentations.